Six Objections to the 'Outsider Test for Faith'

John Loftus claims that we should adopt a skeptical predisposition prior to examining the evidence for a set of religious beliefs. He admits that he prefers this stance even to one of complete neutrality, for the seemingly spurious reason that "complete neutrality, while desirable, seems to be practically impossible." (Still, one has to wonder: why not aim to be as neutral - i.e., as impartial, as fair, as focused on the truth - as possible? Why opt for doubt as such?) In adopting a skeptical predisposition towards our own religious faith and then critically examining that faith, we are accepting the challenge of what Loftus calls 'the outsider test for faith' (OTF).

I have addressed Loftus' attempt to present a real argument for the OTF here and concluded that his argument is purely ad hoc and appears to be based on rather absurd assumptions. Loftus also attempts to defend his 'test' from what he takes to be six objections to his OTF here. Let's analyze these and see if he is any more successful in providing a coherent articulation of his position and a plausible argument for it.

1. The first point Loftus addresses - and which he refers to William Lane Craig - is just that the existence of other people with false religious beliefs does not imply that my religious beliefs are false. While Loftus admits that this is true, he nonetheless points to a 'troubling' possibility: "After all, someone can be right if for no other reason than that she just got lucky to be born when and where she did." In other words, someone might hold a true belief without having any rational justification underlying that belief. But in this case, Loftus asks: "how do you rationally justify such luck?" Hmmm... good question? No; in fact, Loftus' question is a silly red herring. There is no suggestion, in the objection under consideration, of rationally justifying luck; rather the point is that what we must be interested in rationally justifying is the truth of the lucky person's religious beliefs, since that is what we would like to know about: are these religious beliefs true? - and this question obviously cannot be answered by pointing out that if religious beliefs B are true, then religious beliefs not-B must be false. This is straightforward logic; and it has nothing to do with basing beliefs "on luck alone," as Loftus suggests.

2. The second objection is essentially that people convert - so explain that! (Apparently Loftus isn't in the habit of troubling to think through strong objections to his highly cherished beliefs.) Well it turns out that Loftus thinks he can explain it (albeit in a highly schematic and tendentious way - he mentions the fact that converts almost universally fail to read his pro-scepticism book before converting to some other faith). But so what? This 'objection' was never a real objection to begin with: people are just as culturally embedded when they convert as otherwise - whether this conversion is to a religious faith or to scepticism -, and even if there were some way to show that the 'cultural-dependence factor' had been minimized in a given conversion, the only relevant consideration would still be the actual cogency of the individual's reasons for converting. Again, Loftus seems quite clueless in regard to the actual issues his argument needs to address.

3. Third, Loftus flat-out denies the claim that the mere disagreement of rational people about some belief does not justify skepticism about that belief. He presents no argument against this objection; he simply rejects it. He writes: "It’s objected that merely because rational people disagree about something [this] does not justify skepticism about a particular claim. On the contrary, I think it can and it does." But obviously mere disagreement of rational people justifies skepticism only if I am unable (or unwilling) to examine the grounds of that disagreement. (To deny this would obviously be to open the door to near-universal skepticism.) If, however, I am willing and able to examine the grounds of disagreement, there is no reason to default to skepticism; instead I should decide which belief is the most plausible and the best justified.

Loftus continues: "The amount of skepticism warranted depends on the criteria I mentioned earlier. Rational people don’t bet against gravity, for instance, because there is evidence for it that was learned apart from what she was taught to believe in a geographically distinct location." But this is nonsense: the geographic location of my classroom has nothing to do with the truth of what is taught in that classroom, and in any case, all learning and all apprehension of evidence - including in regard to gravity - obviously does take place in some geographically distinct location or other - but that is irrelevant.

In any case, in lieu of argument for his strange claim, Loftus does carry on with some unrelated claims (a.k.a. red herrings). For example: "I’m claiming that religious beliefs warrant probably the highest skepticism given the sociological facts." This is perhaps an impressive-sounding claim, until one realizes that Loftus hasn't actually explained how any 'sociological facts' are actually relevant to his claim about the 'highest skepticism' that he supposes to be warranted in the case of religious beliefs.

4. According to the fourth objection, if the believer is unable (or unlikely) to transcend her cultural conditioning when embracing her particular beliefs, then the skeptic is just another 'believer' and his skepticism is just as culturally dependent. Loftus' solution to this problem is to assert that, because the skeptic knows about the cultural dependence of his beliefs (and because he knows various other irrelevant 'scientific' facts, about EMR, sound waves, molecules, and the like), he is thereby freed from that cultural dependence, he transcends it. How? Because he learns to doubt what he believes! In other words, mirabile dictu, the skeptic is able to transcend his own cultural conditioning, simply in virtue of being a skeptic. And of course a believer is unable to do this, even if she is aware of the cultural dependence of beliefs, simply because she is not a skeptic. Of course, generally speaking, this kind of argument is known as begging the question, but Loftus seems to be okay with that. (Perhaps he believes that his skepticism also absolves him of the need to follow the most basic rules of informal logic - although one would hope that, being a sceptic, he wouldn't place too much faith in this point.)

5. Fifth, Loftus writes: "In arguing that one’s religious faith is overwhelmingly adopted by the “accidents of birth,” have I committed the informal genetic fallacy of irrelevance? This fallacy is committed whenever it’s argued that a belief is false because of the origination of the belief." Here Loftus is confusing things right out of the gate: The informal genetic fallacy of irrelevance is not just committed whenever it’s argued that a belief is false because of the origination of the belief; it is committed whenever it's argued that a belief's truth or falsity depends on its origin. In any case, Loftus clarifies his position: "I’m not arguing that these faiths are false because of how believers originally adopted them. I’m merely arguing believers should be skeptical of their culturally adopted religious faith because of how they first adopted them." Again, however, Loftus is mistaken about the real issue and commits a version of the genetic fallacy in spite of himself: it is simply not a matter of how one first adopted one's beliefs that matters when it comes to assessing their truth or their warrant; what matters is the reasons that actually exist for holding those beliefs. To ignore this fact is indeed to commit the genetic fallacy.

6. Finally Loftus addresses the complaint that he has simply begged the question: "One final objection asks whether this is all circular. Have I merely chosen a different metaphysical belief system based upon different cultural factors?" Naturally he denies it: "I deny this, for I have very good initial grounds for starting out with skepticism based upon the sociological, anthropological and psychological facts." - But as we have seen, Loftus' sociological, anthropological and psychological (not to mention geographical) facts are in fact irrelevant to, rather than supportive of, the OTF and its a priori skepticism. So his claim that he has "very good initial grounds for starting out with skepticism" is simply false. Rather he has very ad hoc initial grounds.

It seems, then, that Loftus' OTF indeed has very little going for it. Even if someone wanted to, it is unclear how he would go about taking the test; but more importantly there seems to be no good reason for wanting to take the test in the first place. If Loftus wanted to clarify his thinking on this subject, I would suggest that he begin by focusing his energy on thinking about the first objection here, and this time restrain himself from wandering off, dragging a red herring behind him. Of course, it seems to me that virtually all of his arguments are such tissues of confusion that there doesn't seem to be much reason for optimism regarding the eventual outcome of his reflections - but that is no excuse for him to not begin where he can and at least give a (more) honest effort next time around.

The "Outsider Test for Faith"

John Loftus - self-advertised as "The Only Atheist William Lane Craig Refuses to Debate - He's afraid of me!" - is the inventor of the so-called 'Outsider Test for Faith' (OTF). The ostensible point of the test is to avoid confirmation bias when it comes to affirming any given religious faith and the ostensible means it claims to offer is that of imagining oneself as an outsider to one's belief system in order to evaluate the claims of that belief system in an unbiased manner. Regarding this test, eminent online atheist and lecturer Richard Carrier has reportedly said:

Though this idea has been voiced before, Loftus is the first to name it, rigorize it, and give it an extensive philosophical defense; moreover, by doing so, he is the first to cause a concerted apologetic to arise attempting to dodge it, to which he could then respond. The end result is one of the most effective and powerful arguments for atheism there is. It is, in effect, a covering argument that subsumes all other arguments for atheism into a common framework.

Would more intelligent atheists agree with Carrier's assessment? Probably not. Jesse Parrish - arguably, a 'more intelligent atheist' - has produced a very nice critique of the OTF here. In his response to Parrish there (see the comments), Loftus ignores the argument and comes back with the following non sequitur: "Jesse, you should temper your conclusions at least somewhat since you are up against philosophers, scientists, biblical scholars, historians and psychologists who think otherwise." So already things look pretty shaky for Loftus and his 'test.'

In any case, what exactly is the OTF and how is it justified? For Loftus it is ever a work in progress, but here is one of his many formulations, carefully(?) laid out - in response to a request from a critic (Victor Reppert) - in the form of an actual argument, with premises and conclusions:

(1) Rational people in distinct geographical locations around the globe overwhelmingly adopt and defend a wide diversity of religious faiths due to their upbringing and cultural heritage. This is the religious diversity thesis.

(2) Consequently, it seems highly likely that adopting one’s religious faith is not merely a matter of independent rational judgment but is causally dependent on cultural conditions to an overwhelming degree. This is the religious dependency thesis.

(3) Hence the odds are highly likely that any given adopted religious faith is false.

(4) So the best way to test one’s adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths. This ex-presses the OTF.

So, aside from a pretty ordinary expression of the general attitude of intellectual complacency and indifference informing the average unbeliever, what have we?

We have, first premise, that there is great religious diversity in the world, due to the great diversity of cultures. Okay, but just to be clear: religious diversity is a constituent of cultural diversity, there is no simple causal priority such that culture causes religion; religion is culture. And cultures (which would include religions, as well as currents of skepticism towards religion), Loftus notes, tend to be geographically segregated in distinct locations. Right; but so what, you ask?

Well, second, and consequently (somehow), it seems that the particular religion that any given individual adheres to can be predicted very reliably on the basis of the individual's 'cultural conditions.' The adoption of a particular religious faith is overwhelmingly dependent on cultural conditions. This general point seems obvious enough, even if Loftus has confused things by first suggesting that the issue of distinct geographical locations was somehow important, whereas what really matters is rather the individual's (presumably geographically transposable) 'cultural conditions.' Fine. But of course this dependence does not actually appear to be a consequence, as Loftus says, of religious diversity in the world - it is just one expression of the fact that human nature is, quite  generally speaking, culturally-embedded (which is quite different from saying that human nature is merely a product of culture - arguably the converse is true - or just as true).

Anyway, third, Loftus further 'concludes' (not really), from the fact that cultural conditions are strongly influential in determining any given individual's religious beliefs, that the odds of any particular religious faith being false are high. Again, this is a non sequitur: the real reason for the high likelihood of any particular religious faith being false is not the fact that cultural conditions are strongly influential in determining any given individual's religious beliefs, but simply the fact that there are many religions and, since they presumably all contradict one another, at most one can be (entirely) true. (For example, think: if 90% of the world's population was Muslim, and Islam was true, this would be entirely compatible with the truth of (2) (the sociological fact about the cultural dependence of religious affiliation), even though (3) would be false, since the odds, for any given individual, of his particular religious beliefs being true, will in this case be very good.)

Fourth, Loftus 'concludes' (with yet another non sequitur) to the soundness of his OTF, namely, that the best way to test one's adopted religious faith is from the perspective of an outsider with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths. So how does that follow?

First, Loftus provides no reason whatsoever in support of his claim that this is 'the best' way to test one's faith. Second, he doesn't even seem to identify any real possible way to test one's faith - how exactly one goes about taking the test he does not say. (Is there a testing centre one should go to, where an enlightened person (Loftus himself, perhaps?) will administer such a test?) Loftus does take the trouble of writing an article/blurb entitled What Does it Mean to Take and Pass the OTF?, which one might hope would answer this question. Unfortunately, instead of answering the rather crucial question, he seems more interested in congratulating himself for his cleverness in devising such a pickle for people of faith and concludes by simply informing us that anyone who has faith must take the OTF. Okay - but still: how? What does it mean to 'take the test'? (And why must everyone with faith take it? - that claim certainly has received no justification.)

So the justification is nonsense, but what to make of Loftus' so-called test, considered in itself? The only information we are given about the test here is that it is a test (1) "from the perspective of an outsider" and (2) "with the same level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths." The obvious questions here are: (1) What is "the perspective of an outsider"? (Which outsider, and why that one?) And (2) what exactly is "the level of skepticism used to evaluate other religious faiths"? (What if, for example, a believer doesn't actually ever evaluate other religious faiths? Believers - like atheists - often have very little understanding of - and thus very little ability to evaluate - their own faith, never mind the faiths of others. Their faith isn't really based on evaluation at all.)

In another (slightly different) formulation (see here) Loftus tells us again what the OTF commands us to do: "Test or examine your religious beliefs (1) as if you were outsiders (2) with the same presumption of skepticism you use to test or examine other religious beliefs." The generality of his statement here implies that he believes that (1) any given 'outsider' will do (apparently all 'outsiders' are epistemic equals, in Loftus' mind) and that (2) every 'insider' has and uses a common (i.e., the same) standard of skepticism when testing or examining other religious beliefs (namely, "the same presumption of skepticism"). These presumptions are both patently absurd, and therefore, it appears, the OTF is patently absurd.

Loftus does have some other bad arguments in support of his view (if you want to read them, refer to previous link). For example, he thinks that the fact adduced in (3) justifies skepticism: "The OTF is no different than the prince in the Cinderella story who must question forty-five thousand girls to see which one lost the glass slipper at the ball last night. They all claim to have done so. Therefore, skepticism is definitely warranted." But this is another non sequitur. It is not skepticism that is 'definitely warranted,' but diligent investigation. Being deceived by some winsome-footed non-Cinderella is really not bad in itself, except that such a deception would prevent the prince from finding the real Cinderella. If Loftus-style skepticism towards religions had the analogous no-Cinderella result (and why might it not?), then it would be just as bad.

Loftus writes further: "The amount of skepticism warranted depends on the number of rational people who disagree, whether the people who disagree are separated into distinct geographical locations, the nature of those beliefs, how they originated, how they were personally adopted in the first place, and the kinds of evidence that can possibly be used to decide between them. My claim is that when it comes to religious beliefs a high degree of skepticism is warranted because of these factors." Again, this is a hopelessly vague non sequitur, not any kind of sound argument. If rational people disagree about some important matter we should not want to adopt skepticism, but to know what their arguments are! If the people live in different places, this is entirely irrelevant to evaluating the epistemic standing of their respective beliefs! Obviously we should want to consider "the nature of those beliefs," but it hardly follows from the bare fact that we have considered 'the nature' of certain beliefs that skepticism will be warranted, - that will depend on what the particular 'nature of those beliefs' turns out to be! And so on.

In the premises of his argument Loftus has raised certain obvious facts about how religious belief is transmitted, but his premises make no mention whatsoever of religious reasoning. Thus, they make no reference to any facts that are actually relevant to assessing his conclusion, which is about how to reason well about religious faith, so as to avoid confirmation bias. Strange argument. It thus turns out that all that Loftus' test and justification thereof amounts to is the wholly unsubstantiated assertion of the virtue of adopting a priori skepticism towards all religious beliefs, which assertion appears to be based on patently absurd assumptions about the uniformly divergent epistemic standards respectively obtaining among 'insiders' and 'outsiders' of religion.